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Included are two essays in the
of a legal
ance,history
the book includes
thoughtful essay by
Michael J. Perry that defends a relatively

hermeneutics (Peter Goodrich on the influ-

ence of Ramism on the common law andJames sophisticated if somewhat open-ended version
of originalism, a version, however, that would
several that focus on contemporary problems hardly satisfy the ex-attorney general. Similarly, other essays illuminate the indeterminacy
in American legal and constitutional theory,

Farr on Francis Lieber's constitutional theory),

and a thoughtful essay by Stanley Fish that
evaluates the book and criticizes many of its
essays.
Historians will probably find the book useful for two primary reasons. First, it is both a
helpful guide to recent interpretavist thinking
and a representative example of contemporary
intellectual attitudes. Hermeneutics is the

thesis. Ken Kress offers a provocative consideration of the relationship between indeterminacy and political legitimacy; Drucilla Cornell emphasizes the unavoidable moral
responsibility that arises from the need to interpret indeterminate legal sources; and Lief
H. Carter describes the de facto views of a
group of state court judges who say that they
"in- rely for the most part not on legal rules but
on their own "vision of community values and
experiences."
In spite of its strengths, Legal Hermeneu-

study (or, some would say, the science) of
terpretation," the disciplined analysis of the
ways "readers" determine the "meaning" of
"texts." Hermeneutics, writes David Couzens
Hoy, "maintains that understanding is already tics may prove unsatisfying to some historians.
interpretation, suggesting thereby that under- The emphasis it places on the importance of
standing is always conditioned by the context contextuality and of the interaction between
reader and text may suggest that Charles Beard
in which it occurs." While the interactive and
and Carl Becker have been reincarnated as
contextualist approach of hermeneutics seems
postmoderns. The book's text-centered orien"antifoundationalist" and perhaps subjectivist
(asJurgen Habermas, for example, maintains),
tation may seem unduly literary (though, for
the contributors to this collection often stress
hermeneuticians and many others, of course,
anything may be a text), and its stress on the
its formalist and even objectivist potential.
complexity of interpretation may seem exces"Hermeneutics sets for itself an ontological
sive in light of some of historians' concerns and
task," explains Gregory Leyh, the book's editor, "namely, identifying the ineluctable rela- sources. Further, the book's recurrent emphationships between text and reader, past and
sis on context, specificity, and interaction sugpresent, that allow for understanding to take gests ultimately that the hermeneutical approach - though compelling in its own terms place at all."
Second, the book casts light on legal issues remains more a sensibility than a method. Inthat historians frequently confront, most
deed, a number of the essayists in Legal Herprominently the so-called theory of constitu- meneutics would probably agree with that
tional originalism (the claim that the "intent
proposition. Finally, to the extent that at least
of the framers" should control interpretation some hermeneuticians either disdain the imof the Constitution) and the indeterminacy
portance of or deny the possibility of recoverthesis (the claim that legal rules do not control ing authorial intent, many historians may simjudicial decisions). With its stress on the unply wish to disagree with them and to believe
avoidable ways in which reader and context
that the effort to understand the intentions of
shape understanding, hermeneutics looms
historical figures - regardless of the difficulties
inevitably as the theoretical mongoose to Ed- and uncertainties involved - is far too interestwin Meese's cobra. Several contributors, in
ing, important, and unavoidable either to
fact, concentrate on showing the impossibility abandon or to slight.
of identifying a true intent of the Framers (for
Edward A. Purcell, Jr.
example, George L. Bruns and Terence Ball) or
New York Law School
on demonstrating that, in any event, intentionalism is "methodologically useless" (Steven
Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels). For bal-
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